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Abstract 
Consistent with the action identification theory proposal that some people identify their actions at a low-level (action 
processing regarding motor parameters) while others generally identify actions at a high-level (regarding goal 
features), and that a low-level of action identification leads to behavioral dysregulation (repetition, doubts about 
completion), checking proneness was found to be related to low-level action identification. Nevertheless, checking 
can be motivated by several factors (dysfunctional beliefs, incompleteness feelings). In the present research, we re-
examine the level at which actions are identified by distinct subtypes of checking-prone participants. In Study 1, 
cluster analysis leads to the identification of four checking subtypes based on two dysfunctional beliefs domains 
(responsibility and perfectionism); our main results suggest that a low-level of action identification may characterize 
a checking subtype that is not motivated by responsibility related dysfunctional beliefs. Study 2 further reveals that 
anxiety features may characterize the checking subtype related to a low-level action identification. 
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Obsessions and compulsions are classically viewed as core features of a unique psychopathological condition, 
namely Obsessive-Compulsive Disorder (OCD). According to this classical conceptualization of Obsessive-
Compulsive (OC) phenomena, obsessions are recurrent unwanted intrusive thoughts or images which provoke 
distress/anxiety and in response to which OCD patients feel compelled to perform mental or physical acts in a 
repeated or stereotyped way, well known as compulsions. This conceptualization of OC phenomena does not, 
however, account for the entire complexity surrounding clinical reality, which in fact points to an important 
heterogeneity in the factors underlying or accompanying OC symptoms (McKay et al., 2004). 
Furthermore, there is evidence in favor of a within-OC dimension heterogeneity (Rasmussen & Eisen, 2002). Clinical 
heterogeneity has particularly been reported in the OC checking dimension (e.g., Ecker & Gönner, 2008; Pinto et al., 
2007; Tolin, Brady, & Hannan, 2008); however studies examining cognitive mechanisms underlying compulsive 
checking did not systematically take such heterogeneity into account. 
Phenomenological characteristics surrounding checking behaviors, including motivational features, can vary 
considerably across high-checking prone people. For example, one may feel responsible for the occurrence or the 
avoidance of threats and feel the need to check safety actions (e.g., stove, door) in order to avoid a feared harmful 
event (i.e., checking predominantly triggered by an inflated sense of responsibility; Salkovskis et al., 2000). Other 
people feel the need to do things perfectly in order to avoid failure (even in a small or insignificant way) because it is 
viewed as a sign of strong personal defeat; the ensuing checking behaviors concern a wide range of routine and 
basic actions, including reading (e.g., rereading passages multiple times in order to make sure they have been 
understood properly), writing (e.g., repeated checking work for typographical errors), dressing (e.g., checking that 
socks and pants are put on correctly) (i.e., checking mainly triggered by perfectionism; Frost & Steketee, 1997). 
Some people check their past actions because they frequently doubt whether they actually either performed the 
intended actions, or performed them correctly, and they subsequently fear the occurrence of potential catastrophes 
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due to their carelessness; related checking behaviors consist of making sure that some safety actions have been 
actually and properly done (i.e., checking triggered by both inflated responsibility and perfectionism; Attiullah, Eisen, 
& Rasmussen, 2000). Finally, some people have difficulties in experiencing a sense of task completion, generally for 
basic and routine actions; they encounter peculiar experiences of dissatisfaction during actions (i.e., feeling that 
something is wrong) with difficulties in identifying what really is wrong and consequently check and repeat these 
actions until they get the feeling that things are “just right” (i.e., checking motivated by incompleteness feelings; Coles, 
Heimberg, Frost, & Steketee, 2005; Summerfeldt, 2004). 
What the above-mentioned checking situations have in common is that people feel the need to check or repeat their 
action despite the obvious goal achievement. In order to explain such phenomena, some authors proposed that 
defective action processing may prevent high-checking prone people from experiencing a sense of goal completion 
(e.g., Murayama et al., 2013; Pitman, 1987; Ursu, Stenger, Shear, Jones, & Carter, 2003). More particularly, it has 
been suggested that high-checking prone people may have an increased difficulty in processing their actions 
regarding goal-related features (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009; Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Jung et al., 2009; Kim et 
al., 2008; Purcell, Maruff, Kyrios, & Pantelis, 1998). Normally, people perform their actions with goal representations 
in mind so that actions are evaluated regarding the extent to which the actual end-state (i.e., action outcome) 
corresponds to the desired state (i.e., the pursued goal). In the case of checking, it has been suggested that a 
defective use of goal representations for guiding the course of action may undermine a sense of goal satisfaction 
which in turn promotes the need to check or repeat some routine actions (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009; Boyer 
& Liénard, 2006). 
The goal processing deficit hypothesis in OC symptoms has been examined in the context of action identification 
theory (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009; Dar & Katz, 2005; Jamnadass, Badcock, & Maybery, 2014). This theory 
posits that any behavior can be identified within a cognitive hierarchy of meanings: the higher-level meanings relate 
to the desired goal and expected outcomes; the lower-level meanings, however, represent instrumental features and 
movement parameters (Vallacher & Wegner, 1987, 1989; Wegner & Vallacher, 1986, 1987). Vallacher and Wegner 
suggest that the level at which an action is identified may reflect the particular representation (movement parameters 
vs. abstract goal) used as a basis for processing and monitoring that action. For example, identifying the act of 
“locking the door” as “putting a key in the lock” shows that the instrumental representation is most accessible, 
whereas identifying this act as “securing the house” reflects the predominant accessibility of goal representation. 
When an act can be identified at both high and low levels (as in the case of habitual actions), people adopt higher 
(more meaningful) levels of action identification over lower-level ones; however, whenever an act becomes complex 
or has been disrupted, people tend to adopt lower levels. Vallacher and Wegner (1989) identified various differences 
in the way individuals understand their own actions according to their predominant level of action identification. Some 
people have the tendency to generally identify routine actions in relation to goals and outcomes (high-level of action 
identification); conversely, some people appear to identify routine actions preferentially according to mechanistic 
details and motor subcomponents (low-level of action identification). The authors also associated the preferential 
level of action identification with distinct modes of action. In particular, chronic low-level action identification may be 
related to more difficulty in adapting representations according to action constraints, leading people to have more 
disruption of the action flow (e.g., more attention focused on the details of performance, doubts about whether the 
action has been completed, increased ‘signals of inconsistency and error’, particularly during routine actions; 
Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). 
In a previous study conducted in the context of this theory, checking symptoms (in a non-clinical sample) were found 
to be related to a lower ability to identify various habitual actions regarding goal and purpose (i.e., a low-level of 
action identification), due to an increased tendency to identify these actions primarily in terms of their procedural 
aspects and motor components (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009). On the other hand, a more recent study 
suggested that checking participants are in fact characterized by a high-level of action identification (i.e., focusing 
goal-related features) and that a low-level of action identification in checking might in fact depend on anxiety 
(Jamnadass et al., 2014). Nevertheless, these two studies contained numerous limits, including small sample size, 
weak effect sizes and more importantly did not take into account the well-acknowledged motivational heterogeneity 
within the checking dimension (Attiullah et al., 2000; Ecker & Gönner, 2008; Rasmussen & Eisen, 2002; Summerfeldt, 
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2004; Tolin et al., 2008). The aim of the present study was to re-examine the goal-processing deficit hypothesis in 
checking by assessing the level of action identification across various subtypes of checking. 
More specifically, Study 1 aimed to better identify subgroups of checking according to the presence or the absence 
of dysfunctional beliefs and the type of those beliefs (i.e., related to responsibility or perfectionism), by using a 
validated statistical method for grouping procedure along pre-specified dimensions. In such analyses, clearly distinct 
groups are created by maximizing between-cluster differences and minimizing within-cluster variability for a chosen 
set of variables; boundaries are drawn around respondents such that each participant is in only one subgroup (e.g., 
Everitt, Landau, Leese, & Stahl, 2011). In this context, cluster analysis appear to be a promising procedure to identify 
subtypes of checking, as this method unambiguously allocates respondents to distinct subgroups (Calamari et al., 
2004; Calamari, Wiegartz, & Janeck, 1999). Clusters identified as being based on responsibility and perfectionism 
dimensions could then be compared along the various action identification levels. Study 2 aimed to directly explore 
whether checking-prone people can be distinguished according to their level of action identification by means of 
cluster analyses (i.e., “low-level of action identification-related checking” vs. “high-level of action identification-related 
checking”) and to compare these checking profiles for various clinical characteristics frequently related to OC 
symptoms, with the hope that this may assist in identifying distinct subtypes of checking (i.e., anxiety levels, the co-
occurrence of other OC dimensions, harm-avoidance and incompleteness features). 
This issue will be examined in participants with sub-clinical levels of checking, consistent with the idea that checking 
can occur in most people with varying degree of severity. People with a sub-clinical level of checking have indeed 
been found to have clinical features and cognitive impairments similar to those identified in checking patients (for a 
review, see Abramowitz et al., 2014). It is in that context that analogue samples have been suggested to constitute 
a valid approach for studying cognitive and behavioural mechanisms hypothesized to be involved in the development 
and/or maintenance of clinically severe OCD symptoms (Abramowitz et al., 2014). This approach has also the 
potential benefit of overcoming some of the methodological problems linked to the use of clinical samples (i.e., 
ongoing pharmacological and psychological therapies could interact with dependent measures). 
2. Study 1 
As already mentioned above, dysfunctional beliefs, such as an inflated sense of responsibility for future negative 
outcomes and perfectionism, are thought to play a key role in the occurrence and maintenance of checking symptoms 
(e.g., Rachman, 2002; Salkovskis et al., 2000). In the particular case of checking, some studies have related these 
symptoms to perfectionism, in the absence of evidence of an inflated sense of responsibility (e.g., OCCWG, 2005; 
Julien, O’Connor, Aardema, & Todorov, 2006; Wu & Cortesi, 2009), while other studies suggest checking symptoms 
are predominantly related to an inflated sense of responsibility (e.g., Myers, Fisher, & Wells, 2008; Tolin, Woods, & 
Abramowitz, 2003). While some studies did not observe any association between checking and responsibility or 
perfectionism beliefs (e.g., Calamari et al., 1999; Miguel et al., 2000; Tolin et al., 2008), others report that checking 
could be connected to both responsibility and perfectionism-related beliefs (e.g., Attiullah et al., 2000; Lind & 
Boschen, 2009). 
The variability of the results across all these studies suggests that there are several checking subtypes based on 
responsibility and perfectionism levels. Furthermore, dysfunctional beliefs are thought to constitute 
phenomenological features that may potentially help characterizing distinct OC subtypes rather than being causal 
factors per se. In that context and knowing that responsibility and perfectionism related features appear specifically 
relevant for the checking OC dimension, this first study aimed to identify distinct checking subtypes based on the 
level of responsibility and perfectionism beliefs. More specifically, we aimed to discriminate between participants with 
high levels of checking symptoms according to their scores on measures of both responsibility and perfectionism-
related beliefs by using the cluster method, and then to compare the various subgroups of checking against the level 
of action identification measure. We also compared the various checking subtypes on a measure of anxiety in order 
to see whether low-level of action identification in checking is due to anxiety, as suggested by Jamnadass et al. 
(2014). 
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2.1. Method 
2.1.1. Participants 
One hundred and ninety-five French-speaking undergraduates (69 males and 126 females) aged between 18 and 
30 (M: 22.13 years, SD = 2.34 years) participated in the study. Participants were randomly recruited from various 
faculties and schools of the university; they were not compensated for their participation. 
2.2.2. Materials and procedure 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants following a full explanation of the experimental procedure. 
Detailed written and oral instructions explained that participants would be asked questions about different aspects of 
routine actions. They were participating anonymously and on a volunteer basis. In an individual testing session, 
participants completed all the measures described below, as well as questionnaires and tasks unrelated to the 
present study. These measures were counterbalanced across subjects. 
Behavior Identification Form (BIF, Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). The BIF is an instrument designed to measure 
individual differences in action identification level across an array of routine actions (i.e., level of personal agency). 
Each item of the BIF consists of an action followed by two alternatives or “identities,” one of which is lower and one 
higher in level. For each action, participants had to choose the alternative that best described the action they would 
carry out. The number of high-level identities chosen defined the subjects’ level of agency. The French version of the 
BIF is a 23-item instrument that has been validated in a previous study intended to replicate Vallacher and Wegner’s 
(1989) study of level of agency (Belayachi & Van der Linden, unpublished results). In this replication study, the French 
version of the BIF had very good internal consistency (.90); exploratory factor analysis revealed the existence of one 
factor, suggesting that the French version of the BIF is a one-dimensional scale. In the present study, the BIF showed 
good internal consistency: .88, which is comparable to that observed in the Belayachi and Van der Linden study. 
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R, Foa et al., 2002). The validated French version of the OCI-R 
(Zermatten, Van der Linden, Jermann, & Ceschi, 2006) is a self-report questionnaire that consists of 18 items 
evaluating six OCD dimensions (three items per dimension): Checking, Washing, Obsessing, Hoarding, Ordering 
and Neutralizing dimensions. Participants were asked to determine to what extent the situation described in each 
particular statement had distressed them during the past month, using a 5-point scale (0 = “not at all”; 4 = “extremely”). 
Total scores range from 0 to 72; scores for the OCI-R subscales range from 0 to 12. The French version of the OCI-
R has good overall psychometric properties and a factorial structure that is identical to that observed in Foa et al.’s 
(2002) original English version (Zermatten et al., 2006a). In the present study, Cronbach’s alphas indicated good to 
acceptable internal consistency for all the measures (OCI-R total score: .83; Checking: .78; Washing: .69; Ordering: 
.82; Obsessing: .83; Hoarding: .78), except for the Neutralizing subscale which showed problematic reliability (α = 
.58). The Neutralizing dimension of the OCI-R tool appeared problematic in several studies, probably because the 
related items are in fact assessing various dimensions (e.g., Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2010; Tolin et al., 2008; 
Zermatten & Van der Linden, 2008). Thus, Neutralizing scores will not be used in our reported results. It is worth 
noticing that the range of scores obtained on each OCD measure included scores comparable to those observed in 
clinical samples (OCI-R total score: 1–46; Checking: 0–12; Washing: 0–9; Obsessing: 0–10; Ordering: 0–12; 
Hoarding: 0–12). 
The Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire-44 (OBQ-44, OCCWG, 2005). The French version of the OBQ-44 (Julien et 
al., 2006) consists of 44 obsessional beliefs, which are rated on a 7-point scale (1 = “disagree very much” to 7 = 
“agree very much”). This questionnaire assesses three belief domains associated with OCD: responsibility/threat 
estimation (i.e., OBQ-44 responsibility; 16 items, score range 16–112); perfectionism/certainty (i.e., OBQ-44 
perfectionism; 16 items, score range 16–112); and importance/control of thoughts (i.e., OBQ-44 thought; 12 items, 
score range 12–84). The current study focuses on the two OBQ-44 subscales that assess beliefs related to personal 
responsibility and perfectionism, respectively. In addition, we compute the OBQ-44 total score, which ranges from 
44 to 308. The psychometric properties of the French version of the OBQ-44 have been found to be comparable to 
those observed in the original version (Julien et al., 2006). In the present study, Cronbach’s alphas indicate very 
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good internal consistency for all the OBQ-44 measures of interest (OBQ-44 total score: .94; OBQ-44 responsibility: 
.90; OBQ-44 perfectionism: .89). 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Spielberger, Gorsuch, Lushene, Vagg, & Jacobs, 1983). The French version of the 
STAI (Bruchon-Schweitzer & Paulhan, 1993) is composed of 40 items that measure two aspects of anxiety. The first 
set of 20 items assesses the respondents’ state of anxiety at the time of the testing session (i.e., STAI-S), while the 
last 20 items constitute a self-reported measure of general anxiety (i.e., STAI-T). Each statement is rated on a 4-
point scale (1 = “not at all” to 4 = “very much so”); 10 items are reverse-scored in the STAI-S and 9 items are reverse-
scored in the STAI-T. For each anxiety inventory, scores are summed, with total possible scores ranging from 20 to 
80; there is no total score. In the present study, we only use the STAI-T, which shows a strong internal consistency 
(.91). 
Table 1: Study 1: Mean scores and SD for the measures of action identification (BIF), dysfunctional beliefs (OBQ-
44 responsibility and perfectionisms subscales), OCD dimensions (Checking, Washing, Ordering, Obsessing, 
Hoarding) and OC severity (OCI-R total scores), and trait anxiety (STAI-T) in the entire sample, and for each 
checking cluster and the control group. 





















(n = 17) 
 
Control group 
(n = 28) 
BIF 14.83 (3.89) 16.19 (2.91) 15.00 (2.85) 17.32 (3.27) 13.35 (3.43) 15.68 (4.64) 
OCI-R Checking 2.57 (2.66) 4.14 (1.85) 5.45 (2.28) 5.41 (2.82) 5.24 (2.61) 0.29 (0.46) 
OCI-R Washing 1.52 (2.03) 2.43 (2.25) 2.75 (2.02) 2.50 (2.46) 1.59 (1.91) 0.29 (0.60) 
OCI-R Ordering 3.75 (3.02) 4.67 (2.46) 4.80 (2.52) 6.05 (3.43) 4.47 (3.37) 0.68 (0.90) 
OCI-R Obsessing 2.45 (2.43) 3.71 (2.99) 2.50 (2.26) 2.68 (2.01) 3.12 (2.93) 0.64 (0.91) 
OCI-R Hoarding 3.97 (2.86) 4.62 (2.64) 4.50 (2.65) 5.91 (2.96) 4.71 (3.42) 0.86 (1.08) 
OCI-R Total score 15.11 (9.02) 20.81 (6.43) 22.00 (6.30) 24.05 (7.21) 20.41 (10.58) 2.75 (1.51) 








52.72 (6.36) 65.34 (6.22) 74.14 (8.64) 39.35 (6.59) 41.82 (13.06) 
OBQ-44 Total score  
131.25 
(36.71) 
145.23 (15.10) 141.74 (16.52) 185.85 (16.03) 96.53 (16.70) 106.00 (29.95) 
Note: BIF = Behavior Identification Form, OCI-R = Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory Revised, STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Trait anxiety form), OBQ-44 = Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire-44. 
2.2. Results and discussion 
2.2.1. Preliminary analyses 
Table 1 summarizes the mean scores, SD, for the measures of the level of action identification, OC dimensions and 
OC severity, anxiety and dysfunctional beliefs, and Table 2 sums up the intercorrelations between those measures 
in the overall sample. An inspection of the correlations reveals that the level of action identification was correlated 
with dysfunctional beliefs (i.e., the OBQ-44 responsibility subscale and the OBQ-44 total score) but also with checking 
scores; there was no association between the level of action identification and the other measures of OC symptoms. 
All the OC measures were related to each measure of dysfunctional beliefs. In addition, the checking dimension was 
highly correlated with the other OC measures and the three OBQ-44 measures correlated significantly with each 
other. Finally, there was no association between level of action identification and anxiety (i.e., STAI-T), while anxiety 
did correlate with the OCD measures, as well as with the measures of dysfunctional beliefs. 
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Table 2: Study1: Inter-correlations between the measures of action identification (BIF), dysfunctional beliefs (OBQ-
44 responsibility and perfectionisms subscales), OCD dimensions (Checking, Washing, Ordering, Obsessing, 
Hoarding) and OC severity (OCI-R total scores), and trait anxiety (STAI-T) in the entire sample. 
 BIF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
OCI-R Checking (1) 0.16 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
OCI-R Washing (2) −0.02 0.42 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
OCI-R Ordering (3) 0.09 0.43 0.30 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
OCI-R Obsessing (4) 0.06 0.17 0.11 0.11 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
OCI-R Hoarding (5) 0.10 0.28 0.23 0.25 0.12 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
OCI-R Total score (6) 0.13 0.74 0.60 0.69 0.45 0.60 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
STAI-T (7) −0.02 0.26 0.24 0.13 0.50 0.19 0.41 ̶ ̶ ̶ 
OBQ-44 Responsibility(8) 0.22 0.21 0.30 0.20 0.29 0.22 0.38 0.32 ̶ ̶ 
OBQ-44 Perfectionism(9) 0.09 0.27 0.31 0.29 0.15 0.15 0.36 0.29 0.64 ̶ 
OBQ-44 Total score (10) 0.18 0.27 0.33 0.29 0.26 0.18 0.41 0.34 0.89 0.87 
Note: Bold values indicate correlations significant at p < .05; BIF = Behavior Identification Form, OCI-R = Obsessive-Compulsive 
Inventory Revised, STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Trait anxiety form), OBQ-44 = Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire-44. 
2.2.2. Group constitution and cluster analyses 
Considering the possible heterogeneity of the checking dimension and the potentially confounding influences of 
correlations between symptoms (OC subtypes and dysfunctional beliefs), zero-order correlations alone cannot 
determine the extent to which checking participants’ level of action identification may vary as a function of their 
motivational reasons for checking (i.e., dominated by dysfunctional beliefs or not). Hence, to address this question 
more directly, we first divided the overall sample into two groups – those high on checking symptoms (High-checking, 
n = 80) and those low on checking symptoms (Low-checking, n = 115) – on the basis of the median sample value for 
the OCI-R checking subscale (Mdn = 2). The mean checking score was 5.12 (SD = 2.45) in the high-checking group 
and .85 (SD = .80) in the low-checking group. The high-checking group was then cluster-analyzed on the basis of 
checking participants’ scores on the OBQ-44 subscales, in order to identify subgroups of checking subjects (defined 
by differences in the strength of OC-related beliefs). As we were interested only in dysfunctional appraisals 
concerning the outcomes of one’s action, rather than the consequences of one’s thoughts, cluster analyses were 
based only on the participants’ subscores on the responsibility and perfectionism OBQ-44 subscales, following the 
recommendations of Clatworthy, Buick, Hankins, Weinman and Horne (2005). 
We first conducted a hierarchical agglomerative cluster analysis in order to explore the possible number of clusters 
from the data (Ward’s method, based on squared Euclidian distance measures). Visual inspection of the dendrogram 
and agglomeration coefficients obtained with this method indicated a four-cluster solution. We then computed an 
iterative partitioning method (K-means) of clustering, which requires that the number of clusters is specified in 
advance, permitting maximization of the similarity of cases within each cluster and the dissimilarity between clusters. 
Since the hierarchical agglomerative clustering method seems to identify four distinct groups of checking based on 
responsibility and perfectionism-related beliefs, the K-means was set to a 4-cluster solution. In order to examine the 
stability of the cluster solution structure, we explored the agreement between the Ward’s method results and the K-
means clustering solutions using Cramer’s V test allowing us to determine whether similar clusters are present 
regardless of the algorithm used to derive them. This analysis indicated a good agreement between the two methods 
(Cramer’s V = .82, p < .001), thereby supporting the four-cluster solution. Finally, we explored the extent to which 
clusters are separated by the severity of the dysfunctional beliefs-related variables. For that purpose, scores on the 
responsibility and on the perfectionism subscales were entered into discriminant function analysis, where the 
identified clusters served as the grouping variable. Discriminant function analysis indicated that the four clusters were 
adequately separated in discriminant function space (see Fig. 1) and that, overall, 95.2% of the cases were correctly 
classified. 
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Figure 1. Four-cluster solution plotted in discriminant function space (Study 1) 
Overall, this procedure showed that, of the 80 checking-prone participants, 21 were assigned to cluster 1, 20 
participants were assigned to cluster 2, 17 participants were assigned to cluster 3, and 22 participants were assigned 
to cluster 4. As can be seen in Figure 1, participants from cluster 1 are characterized by higher scores on the 
responsibility subscale than on the perfectionism subscale (“Responsibility-related checking”). Participants assigned 
to cluster 2 are characterized by higher levels of perfectionism than responsibility-related beliefs (“Perfectionism-
related checking”). Participants in cluster 3 are characterized by lower scores on both the responsibility and 
perfectionism subscales (“Low-beliefs checking”). Finally, cluster 4 identifies a subtype of checking symptoms 
characterized by high scores on both the responsibility and perfectionism subscales (“High-beliefs checking”). 
In order to further characterize the various checking profiles by comparing these checking subtypes to people with 
low-level of OC propensity, a control group was created based on the OCI-R total scores of participants from the 
Low-checking group. This control group consisted of individuals with OCI-R total scores in the lowest quartile of the 
distribution (score < 6; n = 28). Descriptive statistics for each group on all the variables of interest are reported in 
Table 1 and group profiles according to their scores on each measure of interest are depicted in Figure 2. 
2.2.3. Cluster characterization 
All five groups (low-belief checking, responsibility-related checking, perfectionism-related checking, 
responsibility/perfectionism-related checking, and the control group) were compared on the dysfunctional beliefs 
measures (i.e., responsibility and perfectionism OBQ-44 subscales), on the level of action identification scores (i.e., 
mean scores on the BIF) and on anxiety scores (i.e., STAI-T), by means of one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs). 
Any group effect has been further examined by means of LSD post hoc tests with Benjamini–Hochberg corrections 
in order to control for false discovery rate (Benjamini & Hochberg, 1995). Results of post-hoc tests are summarized 
in Table 3. 
Group comparison on responsibility measure. There was a significant effect of group on the responsibility-related 
beliefs OBQ-44 subscale, F(4, 103) = 41.71, p < .001, ²p = .62 (a large effect size, according to Cohen’s criteria). 
Post hoc tests indicated that the “High-beliefs” group had OBQ-44 responsibility scores that were significantly greater 
than for the remaining groups. Similarly, the “Responsibility-related belief group” had significantly greater OBQ-44 
responsibility scores as compared to the other groups, except the “high-beliefs” group. Finally, the “Perfectionism-
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related beliefs” and the “Low beliefs” groups had OBQ-44 responsibility scores that were comparable to that observed 
in the control group. 
Group comparison on perfectionism measure. There was a significant effect of group on the perfectionism-related 
beliefs OBQ-44 subscale, F(4, 103) = 59.08, p < .001, ²p = .70 (a large effect size, according to Cohen’s criteria). 
Post hoc tests indicated that the “High-beliefs” group had OBQ-44 perfectionism scores that were significantly greater 
than for the remaining groups. Similarly, the “Perfectionism-related belief group” had significantly greater OBQ-44 
perfectionism scores as compared to the other groups, except the “high-beliefs” group. Additionally, the 
“Responsibility-related beliefs” group had greater OBQ-44 perfectionism scores as compared to the “Low beliefs” 
group and the control group. Finally, the “Low beliefs” group had OBQ-44 perfectionism scores that were comparable 
to that observed in the control group. 
Group comparison on action identification measure. There was a significant effect of group on the level of action 
identification measure F(4, 103) = 3.23, p = .02, ²p = .11 (a medium effect size, according to Cohen’s criteria). Post 
hoc analyses indicated that the mean action identification scores were significantly smaller for the “Low beliefs” group 
as compared to the “Responsibility-related beliefs” and the “High-beliefs” groups. The lower level of action 
identification in “Low beliefs” group as compared to the control group was marginally significant, while the “Low-
beliefs” group had action identification scores that were comparable to the “Perfectionism-related beliefs” group. 
Interestingly, there was a trend towards significance for the comparison between perfectionism related beliefs and 
the high-beliefs group suggesting that participants in the perfectionism group tended to have lower action 
identification scores as compared to the high-belief group. There were no other significant group differences. 
Group comparison on anxiety measure. Finally, there was a significant effect of group on STAI-B scores, F(4, 103) 
= 5.95, p < .001, ²p = .19 (a medium effect size, according to Cohen’s criteria). Post hoc analyses indicated that the 
mean anxiety scores were comparable across the four checking groups and that the control group had significantly 
lower anxiety scores than all the checking groups, except for the low-beliefs group which was only marginally 
significant. 
Table 3. Study 1: Summary of post-hoc group comparisons on the dysfunctional beliefs measures (responsibility 





DV: OBQ-44 Responsibility   
Responsibility-related checking  Perfectionism-related checking .013 
 Low-beliefs checking <.001 
 High-beliefs checking .003 
 Control group <.001 
Perfectionism-related checking  Low-beliefs checking .004 
 High-beliefs checking <.001 
 Control group .707 
Low-beliefs checking  High-beliefs checking <.001 
 Control group 1 
High-beliefs checking  Control group <.001 
  
DV: OBQ-44 Perfectionism  
Responsibility-related checking Perfectionism-related checking <.001 
 Low-beliefs checking <.001 
 High-beliefs checking <.001 
 Control group .001 
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Perfectionism-related checking  Low-beliefs checking <.001 
 High-beliefs checking .038 
 Control group <.001 
Low-beliefs checking High-beliefs checking <.001 
 Control group 1 
High-beliefs checking  Control group <.001 
  
DV: BIF  
Responsibility-related checking  Perfectionism-related checking 1 
 Low-beliefs checking .034 
 High-beliefs checking 1 
 Control group 1 
Perfectionism-related checking Low-beliefs checking .553 
 High-beliefs checking .096 
 Control group 1 
Low-beliefs checking  High-beliefs checking .002 
 Control group .087 
High-beliefs checking Control group .295 
  
DV: STAI-T  
Responsibility-related checking  Perfectionism-related checking 1 
 Low-beliefs checking .404 
 High-beliefs checking 1 
 Control group <.001 
Perfectionism-related checking  Low-beliefs checking .486 
 High-beliefs checking 1 
 Control group <.001 
Low-beliefs checking High-beliefs checking .851 
 Control group .081 
High-beliefs checking  Control group <.001 
Note: Bold values indicate group differences significant at p < .05 after Benjamini–Hochberg corrections; BIF = Behavior 
Identification Form, STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Trait anxiety form), OBQ-44 = Obsessional Beliefs Questionnaire-
44. 
In summary, Study 1 allowed the identification of four consistent checking subtypes that were being differentially 
associated with dysfunctional beliefs (responsibility-related checking, perfectionism-related checking, 
responsibility/perfectionism-related checking and low-belief checking). Most importantly, participants from the low-
belief checking group were characterized by a low level of action identification (i.e., based on movement parameters 
rather than on goal pursued) as compared to the control group, the responsibility-related belief group and the 
responsibility/perfectionism group. On the other hand, the subgroup of checking participants characterized by both 
responsibility and perfectionism related beliefs appeared to have a high-level of action identification (i.e., goal-related 
focus). The fact that a subgroup of checking is characterized by goal related action identification is consistent with 
the results reported in the Jamnadass et al. (2014) study in which the authors reported checking participants 
identifying actions mainly at a high-level. 
Jamnadass et al. (2014) further reported that the level at which actions are identified in checkers depends mostly on 
anxiety scores. More particularly, the authors observed that checkers with high scores on anxiety measures were 
also those who identified their actions at a low-level, whereas checkers with low scores on anxiety measures tended 
to identify their actions at a high-level. In light of the Jamnadass et al. (2014) suggestion that anxiety decreases the 
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level at which actions are identified in checking participants, one would expect higher anxiety scores in the low-beliefs 
checking subtype (which was characterized by a low-level of action identification) as compared to the high-beliefs 
checking subtype (which showed a tendency for a high-level of action identification). However, all checking 
subgroups had comparable levels of anxiety in our study, which does not support the proposal of Jamnadass et al. 
(2014) that a low-level of action identification in checking depends on anxiety level. 
  
Figure 2. Means of each checking clusters and the control group for the (Z–transformed) measures of action 
identification, dysfunctional beliefs, OCD dimensions and anxiety (Study 1) 
3. Study 2 
The results of Study 1 revealed that checking-prone participants without dysfunctional beliefs are characterized by a 
low-level of action identification (i.e., movement-related focus). On the other hand, there was a subgroup of checking 
participants appearing to have a high-level of action identification (i.e., goal-related focus). Consistent with that 
observed by Jamnadass et al. (2014), it seems that there are two types of checkers: those characterized by a low-
level of action identification and those characterized by a high-level of action identification. Nevertheless, 
phenomenological characteristics that may distinguish these two subtypes of checking remain unclear. 
In this second study, we aimed to better characterize checking related to a low-level of action identification regarding 
experiential features (by contrast to study 1 which focused on the belief level). Indeed, it has been suggested that 
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distinct OC subtypes can be identified regarding two experiential features that may constitute two core motivational 
dimensions: harm avoidance (the immediate feeling of danger) and incompleteness (i.e., the immediate feeling of 
goal dissatisfaction) (Summerfeldt, 2004). Although harm avoidance has been conceptually related to responsibility 
beliefs and incompleteness to perfectionism, it is possible that experiential constructs are better to grasp the effect 
of goal processing on immediate action experience rather than beliefs. If, as we suggest, a low-level of action 
identification is indeed related to impaired action processing in a subtype of checking, then we should expect that 
checking characterized by a low-level of action identification is also characterized by high scores on the 
incompleteness measure and low scores on harm avoidance measure (which might be related to responsibility 
concerns). Additionally, anxiety has been proposed by Jamnadass et al. (2014) to be an important factor for 
distinguishing checkers with high level of action identification to those with a low-level of action identification, although 
we failed to replicate their findings in Study 1. If the Jamnadass et al. (2014) suggestion that low-level of action 
identification is related to anxiety rather than to checking per se, then we should observe higher anxiety scores in 
participants characterized by a low-level of action identification, regardless of their checking proneness. 
Thus, the aim of this second study was to better grasp clinical features that characterize checking related to high-
level of action identification and those specific to checking related to low-level of action identification. For that 
purpose, a large number of participants were clustered according to both their level of checking and their level of 
action identification to directly compare them against various clinical features (i.e., anxiety, harm avoidance 
propensity, incompleteness feelings and other OC dimensions co-occurrence). 
3.1. Method 
3.1.1. Participants 
Four hundred and seventy-five French-speaking undergraduates (182 males and 293 females) aged between 18 and 
35 (M: 22.36 years, SD = 3.07 years) participated in the study. Participants were recruited from various faculties and 
schools of the University of Liège and University of Geneva; they were not compensated for their participation. 
3.1.2. Materials and procedure 
Informed consent was obtained from all participants following a full explanation of the experimental procedure. 
Detailed written and oral instructions explained that participants would be asked questions about different aspects of 
routine actions. They were participating anonymously and on a volunteer basis. In group testing session, participants 
completed all the measures described below, as well as questionnaires unrelated to the present study. These 
measures were counterbalanced across subjects. 
Behavior Identification Form (BIF, Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). The BIF was administered in order to assess the level 
of action focus. In this sample, the French version of the BIF had very good internal consistency (.91), which is 
comparable to that observed in the Belayachi and Van der Linden replication study (unpublished results). 
Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory – Revised (OCI-R, Foa et al., 2002). The French version of the OCI-R (Zermatten 
et al., 2006a) was administered in order to assess six OC measures (Checking, Washing, Ordering, Obsessing and 
Ordering dimensions and OC severity as measured by OCI-R total scores). Cronbach’s alphas indicated good to 
acceptable internal consistency for all the measures (OCI-R total score: .86; Checking: .74; Washing: .73; Ordering: 
.79; Obsessing: .78; Hoarding: .72). The range of scores obtained on each OCD measure included scores 
comparable to those observed in clinical samples (OCI-R total score: 1–56; Checking: 0–12; Washing: 0–12; 
Obsessing: 0–12; Ordering: 0–12; Hoarding: 0–12). 
Obsessive-compulsive trait core dimension questionnaire (OC-TCDQ; Summerfeldt, Kloosterman, Antony, & 
Swinson, 2014). The French version of the OC-TCDQ (Belayachi, Laloyaux & Vander Linden, unpublished results) 
is a 20-item self-report questionnaire assessing two motivational dimensions of OC symptoms: Harm Avoidance (10 
items) and Incompleteness (10 items). For each statement, participants were asked to determine to what extent the 
situation applied to them, using a 5-point scale (1 = “never applies me”; 5 = “always applies to me”). Scores for the 
harm avoidance checking and incompleteness subscales range from 10 to 50. The French version of the OC-TCDQ 
has good overall psychometric properties and a factorial structure that is identical to that observed in Summerfeldt 
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et al. (2014). In the present study, Cronbach’s alphas indicated very good internal consistency for the two motivational 
dimension measures (harm avoidance: .89; incompleteness: .88). 
State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (STAI; Spielberger et al., 1983). The French version of the STAI (Bruchon-Schweitzer 
& Paulhan, 1993) is composed of 40 items that measure two aspects of anxiety. The first set of 20 items assesses 
the respondents’ state of anxiety at the time of the testing session (i.e., STAI-S), while the last 20 items constitute a 
self-reported measure of general anxiety (i.e., STAI-T). Each statement is rated on a 4-point scale (1 = “not at all” to 
4 = “very much so”); 10 items are reverse-scored in the STAI-S and 9 items are reverse-scored in the STAI-T. For 
each anxiety inventory, scores are summed, with total possible scores ranging from 20 to 80; there is no total score. 
In the present study, we use only the STAI-T, which shows a strong internal consistency (.90). 
Table 4: Study 2: Mean scores and SD for the measures of action identification (BIF), OCD dimensions (Checking, 
Washing, Ordering, Obsessing, Hoarding) and OC severity (OCI-R total scores), OC motivational traits (OC-TCDQ 




























(n = 62) 
BIF 14.61 (4.33) 13.79 (1.67) 19.39 (1.86) 12.53 (2.74) 17.42 (2.17) 7.26 (2.35) 
OCI-R Checking 2.67 (2.52) 0.99 (0.81) 1.00 (0.83) 6.25 (2.72) 4.26 (1.11) 1.58 (1.26) 
OCI-R Washing 1.62 (2.23) 0.96 (1.62) 1.01 (1.95) 2.66 (2.71) 2.40 (2.36) 1.39 (2.00) 
OCI-R Ordering 3.45 (2.75) 2.69 (2.19) 2.64 (2.56) 5.11 (2.88) 4.39 (2.96) 2.65 (2.18) 
OCI-R Obsessing 2.63 (2.63) 1.93 (2.10) 1.75 (1.97) 4.02 (3.24) 3.22 (2.69) 2.71 (2.63) 
OCI-R Hoarding 3.76 (2.66) 3.10 (2.45) 3.00 (2.41) 4.92 (2.78) 4.77 (2.48) 3.23 (2.58) 
OCI-R Total score 15.42 (9.99) 10.36 (6.27) 10.15 (6.70) 25.28 (11.00) 21.08 (8.11) 12.32 (7.52) 
STAI-T 40.54 (9.39) 39.21 (9.42) 37.07 (8.16) 45.34 (10.46) 41.90 (8.08) 40.24 (8.81) 
OC-TCDQ Harm 21.79 (7.25) 19.39 (6.10) 18.99 (5.99) 25.88 (7.95) 25.00 (6.51) 20.73 (7.23) 
OC-TCDQ 
Incompleteness 
24.55 (7.42) 22.27 (6.38) 21.07 (5.65) 29.33 (7.79) 28.75 (7.06) 21.81 (5.40) 
Note: BIF = Behavior Identification Form, OCI-R = Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory Revised, STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety 
Inventory (Trait anxiety form), OC-TCDQ = Obsessive-compulsive trait core dimension questionnaire. 
3.2. Results and discussion 
3.2.1. Preliminary analyses 
Table 3 summarizes the mean scores, SD, for the measures of the level of action focus, OC dimensions, OC 
motivational dimensions and anxiety. Table 4 shows the intercorrelations between those measures in the overall 
sample. An inspection of the correlations reveals that the level of action focus was slightly correlated with anxiety 
and obsessing measures; there was no association between the level of action focus and the measures of OC 
symptoms, OC motivational dimensions and anxiety. All six OC measures (i.e., the OCI-R checking, washing, 
ordering, obsessing and hoarding subscales and the OCI-R total score) were related to each measure of OC 
motivational dimension (i.e., harm avoidance and incompleteness subscales of the OC-TCDQ). In addition, the five 
OC measures were highly intercorrelated and the two OC-TCDQ subscales correlated significantly with each other. 
Finally, the measure of anxiety (i.e., STAI-T) correlated with the six OC measures, as well as with the measures of 
OC motivational dimensions. 
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3.2.2. Group constitution and cluster analyses 
In order to identify subgroups of participants according to both their proneness to checking and their level of action 
focus, the entire sample was cluster-analyzed on the basis of participants’ scores on the BIF and the checking OCI-
R subscale. The clustering method was exactly the same as that used in Study 1. A hierarchical agglomerative cluster 
analysis (Ward’s method, based on squared Euclidian distance measures) indicated a five-cluster solution based on 
the level of action focus and checking scores. Cramer’s V indicated an acceptable agreement between the Ward’s 
method results and the K-means clustering solutions (Cramer’s V = .76, p < .001), thereby supporting the five-cluster 
solution. Finally, a discriminant function analysis indicated that the five clusters were adequately separated in 
discriminant function space (see Figure 3) and that, overall, 92.8% of the cases were correctly classified. 
Table 5. Study 2: Inter-correlations between the measures of action identification (BIF), (Checking, Washing, 
Ordering, Obsessing, Hoarding), and OC severity (OCI-R total scores), OC motivational traits (OC-TCDQ harm and 
incompleteness subscales) and trait anxiety (STAI-T). 
 BIF (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OCI-R Checking (1) −0.02 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
OCI-R Washing (2) 0.03 0.40 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
OCI-R Ordering (3) 0.03 0.41 0.36 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
OCI-R Obsessing (4) −0.09 0.34 0.31 0.29 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
OCI-R Hoarding (5) 0.04 0.31 0.25 0.21 0.36 ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
OCI-R Total score (6) 0.00 0.71 0.65 0.67 0.69 0.61 ̶ ̶ ̶ 
STAI-T (7) −0.09 0.30 0.18 0.21 0.54 0.31 0.44 ̶ ̶ 
OC-TCDQ Harm (8) 0.00 0.41 0.31 0.30 0.64 0.40 0.60 0.61 ̶ 
OC-TCDQ Incompleteness (9) 0.03 0.48 0.37 0.58 0.49 0.37 0.68 0.41 0.63 
Note: Bold values indicate correlations significant at p < .05; BIF = Behavior Identification Form, OCI-R = Obsessive-Compulsive 
Inventory Revised, STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Trait anxiety form), OC-TCDQ = Obsessive-compulsive trait core 
dimension questionnaire. 
Overall, this procedure showed that, of the 475 participants, 135 were assigned to cluster 1, 96 participants were 
assigned to cluster 2, 83 participants were assigned to cluster 3, 99 participants were assigned to cluster 4 and 62 
participants were assigned to cluster 5. As can be seen in Figure 3, participants from cluster 1 are characterized by 
low scores on the checking subscale and middle scores on the action identification measure (“Non-checking middle 
identification”). Participants assigned to cluster 2 are characterized by low scores on the checking subscale and 
higher levels of action identification (“Non-checking high-identification”). Participants in cluster 3 are characterized 
by high scores on checking subscale and low-levels of action identification (“Checking low-identification”). 
Participants in cluster 4 are characterized by high scores on the checking subscale and high-levels of action 
identification (“Checking high-identification”). Finally, cluster 5 identifies a subgroup characterized by extremely low-
levels of action identification and mixed scores on checking (“Non-checking low-identification”). Descriptive statistics 
for each group on all the variables of interest are reported in Table 3 and group profiles according to their scores on 
each measure of interest are depicted in Figure 4. 
3.2.3. Cluster characterization 
All five groups (Non-checking low-identification, Non-checking middle identification, Non-checking high-identification, 
Checking low-identification and Checking high-identification) were compared on all variables of interest by means of 
one-way analyses of variance (ANOVAs). Any group effect has been further examined by means of LSD Post hoc 
analyses with Benjamini–Hochberg corrections in order to control for false discovery rate (Benjamini & Hochberg, 
1995). Results of post-hoc tests are summarized in Table 6. 
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Figure 3. Five-cluster solution plotted in discriminant function space (Study 2) 
3.2.3.1. Group comparison on clustering measures (action identification and checking) 
Action identification scores. Results of this analysis showed that there was a significant effect of group on the level 
of action identification, F(4, 470) = 376.20, p < .001, ²p = .76 (a large effect size, according to Cohen’s criteria). Post 
hoc analyses indicated that cluster 5 (“Non-checking low-identification”) had significantly lower levels of action 
identification than all other groups. Cluster 3 (“Checking low-identification”) had significantly greater BIF scores than 
cluster 5 (“Non-checking low-identification”) but significantly lower action identification levels than the “Non-checking 
middle identification”, “Non-checking high-identification” and the “Checking high-identification” clusters. Cluster 1 
(“Non-checking middle identification”) had significantly greater BIF scores than clusters 3 (“Checking low-
identification”) and 5 (“Non-checking low-identification”) but significantly lower scores than the “Non-checking high-
identification” and the “Checking high-identification” clusters. Cluster 4 (“Checking high-identification”) had 
significantly greater BIF scores than clusters 1, 3 and 5 but significantly lower scores than the “Non-checking high-
identification” cluster. Finally, Cluster 2 (“Non-checking high-identification”) had significantly greater BIF scores than 
all other groups. 
Checking scores. There was a significant effect of group on checking scores, F(4, 470) = 245.25, p < .001, ²p = .68 
(a large effect size, according to Cohen’s criteria). Post hoc analyses indicated that cluster 3 (“Checking low-
identification”) had significantly higher checking scores than all other groups. Cluster 4 (“Checking high-identification”) 
had significantly lower checking scores than cluster 3 (“Checking low-identification”) but significantly greater checking 
scores than the remaining non-checking clusters, suggesting that the combination of checking and low-level action 
identification goes along with increased checking severity. Cluster 5 (“Non-checking low-identification”) had 
significantly lower checking scores than checking clusters 3 and 4 but significantly greater checking scores than the 
“Non-checking middle identification” and “Non-checking high-identification” , highlighting the fact that increased levels 
of checking scores are associated with a tendency to focus on motor parameters rather than on goal. Finally, cluster 
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1 (“Non-checking middle identification”) and cluster 2 (“Non-checking high-identification”) had comparable levels of 
checking scores. 
3.2.3.2. Group comparison on the other OC dimensions 
Washing scores. There was a significant effect of group on washing scores, F(4, 470) = 13.91, p < .001, ²p = .11 (a 
medium effect size, according to Cohen’s criteria). Post hoc analyses indicated that cluster 3 (“Checking low-
identification”) and cluster 4 (“Checking high-identification”) had comparable levels of washing and both groups had 
significantly greater washing scores than the remaining groups. Cluster 1 (“Non-checking middle identification”), 2 
(“Non-checking high-identification”) and 5 (“Non-checking low-identification”) had comparable washing scores. 
Ordering scores. There was a significant effect of group on ordering scores, F(4, 470) = 18.94, p < .001, ²p = .14 (a 
medium effect size, according to Cohen’s criteria). Post hoc analyses indicated that cluster 3 (“Checking low-
identification”) and cluster 4 (“Checking high-identification”) had significantly greater ordering scores than the 
remaining groups; whereas Cluster 1 (“Non-checking middle identification”), 2 (“Non-checking high-identification”) 
and 5 (“Non-checking low-identification”) had comparable ordering scores. 
Obsessing scores. There was a significant effect of group on the obsessing measure, F(4, 470) = 13.38, p < .001, 
²p = .10 (a medium effect size, according to Cohen’s criteria). Post hoc analyses indicated that cluster 3 (“Checking 
low-identification”) had obsessing scores comparable to that observed in cluster 4 (“Checking high-identification”), 
but significantly greater obsessing scores than the remaining non-checking groups. Cluster 4 (“Checking high-
identification”) had significantly greater obsessing scores than cluster 1 (“Non-checking middle identification”) and 2 
(“Non-checking high-identification”), but comparable scores to cluster 5 (“Non-checking low-identification”). 
Interestingly, cluster 5 (“Non-checking low-identification”) had greater obsessing scores than cluster 2 (“Non-checking 
high-identification”) but scores that are comparable to cluster 1 (“Non-checking middle identification”). Finally, cluster 
1 (“Non-checking middle identification”) and cluster 2 (“Non-checking high-identification”) had comparable obsessing 
scores. 
Hoarding scores. Finally, there was a significant effect of group on hoarding proneness, F(4, 470) = 13.42, p < .001, 
²p = .10 (a medium effect size, according to Cohen’s criteria). Post hoc analyses indicated that cluster 3 (“Checking 
low-identification”) and cluster 4 (“Checking high-identification”) had comparable levels of hoarding and both groups 
had significantly greater hoarding scores than the remaining groups. Cluster 1 (“Non-checking middle identification”), 
2 (“Non-checking high-identification”) and 5 (“Non-checking low-identification”) had comparable hoarding scores. 
3.2.3.3. Group comparison on core motivational dimensions (harm avoidance, 
incompleteness) 
Harm avoidance scores. There was a significant effect of group on harm avoidance scores, F(4, 470) = 22.51, p < 
.001, ²p = .16 (a medium effect size, according to Cohen’s criteria). Post hoc analyses indicated that cluster 3 
(“Checking low-identification”) and cluster 4 (“Checking high-identification”) had comparable harm avoidance scores 
and these two checking clusters had greater harm avoidance scores than the other groups. Cluster 1 (“Non-checking 
middle identification”), 2 (“Non-checking high-identification”) and 5 (“Non-checking low-identification”) had 
comparable harm avoidance levels. 
Incompleteness scores. There was also a significant effect of group on the incompleteness measure, F(4, 470) = 
34.83, p < .001, ²p = .23 (a medium effect size, according to Cohen’s criteria). Post hoc analyses indicated that 
cluster 3 (“Checking low-identification”) and cluster 4 (“Checking high-identification”) had comparable levels of 
incompleteness and both had greater incompleteness scores than the other groups. Cluster 1 (“Non-checking middle 
identification”), 2 (“Non-checking high-identification”) and 5 (“Non-checking low-identification”) had comparable levels 
of incompleteness. 
Hence, “Checking low-identification” and “Checking high-identification” had comparable levels of harm avoidance 
and incompleteness. This suggests that, contrary to our expectations, the two motivational core dimensions are not 
underlying distinct levels of action identification in checking. 
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3.2.3.4. Group comparison on anxiety levels 
There was a significant effect of group on anxiety levels, F(4, 470) = 10.70, p < .001, ²p = .08 (a medium effect size, 
according to Cohen’s criteria). Post hoc analyses indicated that cluster 3 (“Checking low-identification”) had 
significantly greater anxiety scores than the remaining groups. Cluster 4 (“Checking high-identification”) had 
significantly greater anxiety levels than non-checking clusters (cluster 1: “Non-checking middle identification” and 2: 
“Non-checking high-identification”), except cluster 5 (“Non-checking low-identification”). 
Table 6. Study 2: Summary of post-hoc group comparisons on the level of action identification scores (BIF scores), 
on OCD dimensions (Checking, Washing, Ordering, Obsessing, Hoarding), on OC motivational traits (OC-TCDQ 




DV: BIF   
Non-checking middle identification  Non-checking high-identification <0.001 
 Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
Non-checking high-identification Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
Checking low-identification Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
Checking high-identification Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
   
DV: OCI-R Checking   
Non-checking middle identification  Non-checking high-identification 1 
 Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 0.100 
Non-checking high-identification Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 0.197 
Checking low-identification Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
Checking high-identification Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
   
DV: OCI-R Washing   
Non-checking middle identification  Non-checking high-identification 1 
 Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 1 
Non-checking high-identification Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 1 
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Checking low-identification Checking high-identification 1 
 Non-checking low-identification 0.005 
Checking high-identification Non-checking low-identification 0.042 
   
DV: OCI-R Ordering   
Non-checking middle identification  Non-checking high-identification 1 
 Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 1 
Non-checking high-identification Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 1 
Checking low-identification Checking high-identification 1 
 Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
Checking high-identification Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
   
DV: OCI-R Obsessing   
Non-checking middle identification  Non-checking high-identification 1 
 Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 0.747 
Non-checking high-identification Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 0.283 
Checking low-identification Checking high-identification 0.524 
 Non-checking low-identification 0.024 
Checking high-identification Non-checking low-identification 1 
   
DV: OCI-R Hoarding   
Non-checking middle identification  Non-checking high-identification 1 
 Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 1 
Non-checking high-identification Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 1 
Checking low-identification Checking high-identification 1 
 Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
Checking high-identification Non-checking low-identification 0.002 
   
DV: OC-TCDQ Harm   
Non-checking middle identification  Non-checking high-identification 1 
 Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 1 
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Non-checking high-identification Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 1 
Checking low-identification Checking high-identification 1 
 Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
Checking high-identification Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
   
DV: OC-TCDQ Incompleteness   
Non-checking middle identification  Non-checking high-identification 1 
 Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 1 
Non-checking high-identification Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification <0.001 
 Non-checking low-identification 1 
Checking low-identification Checking high-identification 1 
 Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
Checking high-identification Non-checking low-identification <0.001 
   
DV: STAI-T   
Non-checking middle identification  Non-checking high-identification 1 
 Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification 0.384 
 Non-checking low-identification 1 
Non-checking high-identification Checking low-identification <0.001 
 Checking high-identification 0.002 
 Non-checking low-identification 0.498 
Checking low-identification Checking high-identification 0.150 
 Non-checking low-identification 0.010 
Checking high-identification Non-checking low-identification 1 
Note: Bold values indicate group differences significant at p < .05 after Benjamini–Hochberg corrections; BIF = Behavior 
Identification Form, OCI-R = Obsessive-Compulsive Inventory Revised, STAI-T = State-Trait Anxiety Inventory (Trait anxiety 
form), OC-TCDQ = Obsessive-compulsive trait core dimension questionnaire. 
To sum up, this second study suggests that checking prone participants related to a low-level of action identification 
are characterized by higher anxiety proneness as compared to checking participants characterized by a high-level 
of action identification. Interestingly, non-checking participants related to a low-level of action identification were also 
characterized by higher anxiety scores, as compared to the other non-checking clusters. These results are consistent 
with the Jamnadass et al. study. Finally, checking characterized by a low-level of action identification and checking 
characterized by a high-level of action identification had comparable levels of harm avoidance and incompleteness. 
This suggests that the two motivational core dimensions are not underlying distinct levels of action identification in 
checking. 
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Figure 4. Means of each cluster for the (Z–transformed) measures of action identification, OCD dimensions, anxiety 
and OC motivational traits (Study 2) 
4. General Discussion 
This research aimed to explore the level (i.e., high-level goal aspects vs. low-level movement parameters) at which 
checking-prone participants identify various habitual actions and to further clarify the relationship between checking 
and action identification in the context of the heterogeneity within the OC checking dimension. 
Our results can be summarized as follows: The first study allowed the identification of distinct checking subtypes 
according to the predominance of responsibility and perfectionism beliefs, which are consistent with the hypothesized 
heterogeneity within OC subtypes (Rasmussen & Eisen, 2002), and the checking subtype in particular (e.g., Ecker 
& Gönner, 2008; Tolin et al., 2008). In Study 1, our main results suggest that the hypothesized lack of goal processing 
(i.e., low-level of action identification) appears to be specifically connected to checking prone participants who are 
not motivated by responsibility related dysfunctional beliefs, consistent with the idea that within OCD dimensions 
heterogeneity implies, at least partly, distinct underlying cognitive factors. According to the action identification theory, 
low-level action representations guide actions when goal representations are absent during action processing 
(Wegner, Vallacher, Macomber, Wood, & Arps, 1984). From this perspective, checking, that is not connected to 
responsibility beliefs, can be conceptualized as a lack of action processing regarding goal-related information that 
normally triggers feelings of goal satisfaction and subsequent action closure. This could explain the repeated 
enactment of routine actions regardless of the obvious achievement of the goal. Further studies are also needed to 
clarify the connection between action identification and action monitoring. Indeed, what remains unclear is whether 
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action identification reflects a general problem in activating goal representations during action evaluation, which in 
turn disturbs action monitoring mechanisms or whether a general dysfunction of action monitoring mechanisms leads 
people to chronically focus on the details of action, since recurrent perception of error leads to spontaneous focus 
on motor parameters. 
Hence, the results of Study 1 are in line with the idea that a lack of goal processing (i.e., a low level of action 
identification) might be connected with checking behaviors (Belayachi & Van der Linden, 2009; Belayachi & Van der 
Linden, 2015; Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Jung et al., 2009; Kim et al., 2008), and we further highlight the fact that such 
particularity might be specifically related to checking that occur in the absence of responsibility related beliefs. 
This could be useful for clinicians as there is some evidence of poor efficacy of classical therapy (based on exposure 
and on beliefs changes) with some OC patients (i.e., those who do not experience fear or responsibility beliefs; 
Cottraux et al., 2001; Whittal, Thordarson, & McLean, 2005). In that context, the action identification measure could 
be an interesting diagnostic tool in order to improve psychological counselling, for example by building up a tailor-
made therapeutic strategy consisting in training low-action identification in high-checking prone people to process 
their actions in terms of goal-related features (e.g., by focusing attention on action-effect related features). Our results 
may also explain, at least partly, inconsistent results across various studies on cognitive aspects of checking. Indeed, 
a lack of goal processing has been connected to a lower ability to remember whether previous intentions have been 
accomplished (i.e., defective memory) (Vallacher & Wegner, 1989). Interestingly, numerous studies have reported 
disturbed memory for motor actions in checking (e.g., Zermatten, Van der Linden, Larøi, & Ceschi, 2006), whereas 
other studies failed to replicate such findings (e.g., Hermans, Martens, De Cort, Pieters, & Eelen, 2003). Knowing 
that the extent to which episodes are encoded in terms of goal-related information may determine the richness of the 
resulting episodic encoding (Conway, 2001), one could argue that an impaired ability to process goal-related 
information during enactment might consequently impair how these actions are stored in memory in a subtype of 
checking that is characterized by a low-level of action identification. Further studies should directly explore the extent 
to which memory impairments in some checking behaviours are secondary to defective goal processing. 
From Study 1 has emerged an intriguing pattern of apparently inconsistent results suggesting that participants from 
the perfectionism-related group, which had a level of action identification that was not statistically different from that 
observed in the low-beliefs group, was thus characterized by a low-level of action identification. Knowing that 
perfectionism is classically viewed as a set of beliefs, one could argue that such results exclude de facto the possibility 
that a low-level of action identification in chronic checking is characterized by an absence of dysfunctional beliefs. 
Nevertheless, looking in detail at BIF scores of the perfectionism related subgroup reveals that level of action 
identification in that checking subgroup was not particularly low, as it was comparable to the mean BIF score in the 
whole sample of Study 1 as well as to that reported in previous studies using BIF measure (see Vallacher & Wegner, 
1989). By contrast, the mean BIF score of checking participants in the low-beliefs group was below the generally 
reported mean BIF score in the literature as well as in the whole sample of Study 1. Besides, perfectionism 
encompasses in fact multiple dimensions (Frost, Marten, Lahart, & Rosenblate, 1990), some of which are not 
connected with dysfunctional beliefs (e.g., chronic doubts about whether intended actions have been 
actually/properly performed, focus on details). Such heterogeneity in perfectionism cannot however be further 
examined by means of the OBQ-44 perfectionism subscale. Hence, future studies should be conducted in order to 
directly address this question by using other measures, such as the Frost Multidimensional Perfectionism Scale 
(FMPS, Frost et al., 1990) which is designed specifically to assess distinct dimensions of perfectionism. Using distinct 
perfectionism dimensions (i.e., related to beliefs vs. not related to beliefs) as clustering variables may help addressing 
this issue. 
The second study further highlighted that checking participants related to a low-level of action identification (i.e., lack 
of action processing regarding goal-related features) are also characterized by high-levels of anxiety. Furthermore, 
Study 2 revealed that anxiety also increased in the subgroup of non-checking participants characterized by an 
extremely low-level of action identification (i.e., Non-checking low-identification” subgroup). The connection between 
anxiety and low-level action identification we observed is consistent with the Jamnadass et al. (2014) study showing 
that checking participants with high-levels of anxiety are also characterized by low-levels of action identification. High-
levels of anxiety have been reported to lead individuals to focus their attention on details, favoring local perceptual 
information processing (e.g., Boyer & Liénard, 2006; Derryberry & Reed, 1998). Furthermore, anxiety has been 
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connected to defective action monitoring comparable to that observed in OC phenomena (i.e., increased error 
signaling; Moser, Moran, & Jendrusina, 2012). Hence, one could argue that anxiety might play a key role in defective 
goal processing in some checking profiles, as suggested by Jamnadass et al. (2014). Nevertheless, if a low-level of 
action identification is indeed due to anxiety, Non-checking participants characterized by an extremely low-level of 
action identification in Study 2 should have reported anxiety levels comparable to that observed in the checking low-
identification cluster, which was not the case. Furthermore, if anxiety is directly responsible for low-level of action 
identification, then checking participants characterized by a low-level of action identification (not related to 
dysfunctional beliefs) in Study 1 should have had higher anxiety scores than the other checking subgroups, which 
was not the case since they had levels of anxiety comparable to that observed in the other checking subgroups. One 
possible explanation for the connection between anxiety and action identification is that a low-level of action 
identification, which has been related to increased action dysregulation and general dissatisfaction with one’s 
efficiency, could lead to higher anxiety in some people. However, the link between anxiety and action identification 
is speculative in both the present research and in the Jamnadass et al. (2014) study as the methods used across the 
two research projects were not tailored to find any causal explanation. Thus, future studies should be conducted in 
order to directly determine whether anxiety per se leads to low-levels of action identification or whether an increased 
difficulty in experiencing goal completion and related doubts could lead some people to develop anxiety symptoms. 
In study 2, we also expected that checking prone participants with low-level of action identification are also those 
characterized by an increased tendency to experience incompleteness phenomena, in line with the suggestion that 
checking behaviors not motivated by harm avoidance and responsibility beliefs stem in fact from incompleteness 
feelings (e.g., Coles, Heimberg, Frost, & Steketee, 2005; Summerfeldt, 2004; Tolin et al., 2008), explaining the 
abnormal focus on the details of action in that type of checking (Summerfeldt, 2004). However, this hypothesis was 
not supported by our results. It is worth noticing that incompleteness dimension (INC) and the harm avoidance 
dimension (HA) as measured by the OC-TCDQ were highly correlated with each other in the present study as well 
as in other studies (magnitude of correlation ranging from .52-.76; Ecker, Kupfer, & Gönner, 2014; Pietrefesa & Coles, 
2008, 2009). Although factorial analyses suggest that a two-factor model provides a better fit than a single factor 
model (Pietrefesa & Coles, 2008; Summerfeldt et al., 2014; Taylor et al., 2014), the two factors appear systematically 
highly correlated with one another suggesting that both convey to a similar phenomenon (e.g., premonition-like 
experiences). Furthermore, the INC dimension of the OC-TCDQ appears highly correlated with other harm avoidance 
measures in a recent research (Taylor et al., 2014). Hence, considering the very strong correlation between INC and 
HA, it is possible that incompleteness as measured by the OC-TCDQ does not allow for a clear distinction between 
harm avoidance related checking and a checking subtype characterized by a chronic low-level of action identification. 
Another possible explanation would be that checking related to low-level of action identification and checking 
connected to incompleteness reflect in fact distinct checking profiles: in the former case, checking convey difficulties 
in determining whether past actions have been actually or properly performed (i.e., doubt-related checking), while 
the latter conveys the immediate feeling that “something’s wrong” with an ongoing action (i.e., error-related checking). 
If this is the case, the behavioral counterpart should varied such that in the first case checking may consist in 
interrupting an ongoing action in order to check whether previous actions have been done properly, which is 
consistent with the idea that goal processing and memory for actions might be interconnected, as suggested above; 
whereas, in the latter case, checking may consist in immediate “on-line” correction of action, which is consistent with 
the idea that incompleteness features are connected with impaired motor control mechanisms implicated in on-line 
monitoring during performance (Summerfeldt, 2004). 
It is also worth noticing that the present research revealed the existence of a subtype of checking with a tendency to 
be characterized by a high-level of action identification (i.e., general tendency to process actions regarding to goal-
features; Study 2), consistent with the results of Jamnadass et al. (2014), and the co-occurrence of an inflated sense 
of responsibility and perfectionism tended to go along with a high-level of action identification in a dysfunctional 
beliefs-based subtype of checking (Study 1). These results should be interpreted in conjunction with a study in which 
washing patients, which are often connected with responsibility concerns, have been reported to identify the habitual 
action of washing one’s hands at a high-level as compared to non-OCD controls (Dar & Katz, 2005). Nevertheless 
Dar and Katz examined the identification of an action that is strongly linked to compulsive ritual-related concerns 
(i.e., washing). It would be interesting to see whether dysfunctional beliefs-based checking is connected with a 
general tendency to identify various habitual actions at a high-level or whether high level action identification in 
 Journal of Experimental Psychopathology, Volume 8 (2017), Issue 3, 214-240 236 
connection with responsibility and threat concerns is specific to certain actions, such as security related actions (e.g., 
stove, window, door). As depicted in case reports, some patients check specifically significant actions (those with 
important negative consequences if not realized properly) while others repeat and check a wide range of basic actions 
(reading, shoelaces, socks, etc.). Hence, for some OC symptoms, action identification could be content-dependent 
(e.g., avoiding contamination, avoiding security related problems) rather than process-based (Dar & Katz, 2005). 
Nevertheless, there was no difference on action identification measure between the checking group related mainly 
to responsibility, the checking group related to responsibility and perfectionism and the control group in Study 1. This 
suggests that dysfunctional beliefs related checking does not go along with an extremely high level of action 
identification. Further studies should thus be conducted in order to examine these issues. 
The present research points to the importance of taking the checking heterogeneity into account when examining the 
cognitive correlates of checking, in order to increase effect replicability. Indeed, the correlation between checking 
and action identification varied across the two studies, probably because it is not a linear relation between the general 
measure of checking and the measure of action identification. The connection between checking and low-level of 
action identification may mostly depend on the reason as to why one frequently check one’s everyday behaviors 
(e.g., a chronic difficulty in determining whether an intended goal has been achieved vs. the general desire to control 
random threatening events). The failure of effect replicability in cognitive studies on checking is more the rule than 
the exception. Hence, as suggested by numerous studies, the motivational heterogeneity underlying OC symptoms 
might be systematically taken into account when it comes to examine specific factors potentially connected to 
checking. 
Before concluding we should highlight the several limitations to this study. A first important limitation is the 
questionnaire based nature of the present study; a further empirical examination of the causal relationship between 
a low level of action identification and checking is needed. One way to examine this issue would consist in preventing 
people with low-checking propensity to process basic actions regarding goal-related features (by focusing on motor 
parameters/action details) and examining whether it may lead them to be less sure about their past performances 
and, if they are given the possibility of checking their past performances, to checking-like behaviours. Second, a lack 
of goal processing could be a side effect of other factors, such as attentional focus or the checking per se; this should 
also be explicitly examined in further studies. Third, although cluster analyses can be considered as a reliable tool 
for the assessment of various subtypes of OC symptoms, it is worth developing a reliable measure designed to more 
directly assess the various subtypes of checking (i.e., a measure of checking heterogeneity). Finally, our results 
should be replicated in a sample of people with more severe checking symptoms (i.e., OCD patients). 
In conclusion, results of the present research suggest that peculiar action processing can be reported in a subtype 
of checking that is not connected to responsibility related beliefs. Besides, the question regarding perfectionism 
beliefs domain still requires further examination knowing the multidimensional aspect of the perfectionism concept. 
Across the two studies, we found evidence further supporting the hypothesized heterogeneity within the mechanism 
implicated in checking behaviors, highlighting the predominantly low-level of action identification that may 
characterize high-checking prone people with a subset of clinical characteristics (i.e., not connected with 
responsibility beliefs, potentially in association with some perfectionism related features, characterized by high-levels 
of anxiety). These results support the idea that some checking individuals perform actions that are disconnected from 
the goal they wish to achieve. This may explain why they have concerns about the details of their actions, and why 
they repeat them, even after achieving their goal. These findings are quite important because they may explain both 
inconsistent results in studies examining the defective action processing hypothesis in compulsive checking, and 
why cognitive interventions for OCD based on the idea that some dysfunctional beliefs, such as responsibility related 
beliefs, are triggering factors have not led to improvements in treatment efficacy (Cottraux et al., 2001; Whittal, 
Thordarson, & McLean, 2005). Knowing that it is possible to train people to identify their actions at a particular level, 
further studies should try to train the low-level of action identification-related checking subtype to process their actions 
in terms of goal-related features (e.g., by focusing attention on action-effect related features) in order to reduce 
doubts about goal satisfaction. 
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